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UNPLANNED RESISTANCE: 
TURKISH IMMIGRANTS IN A POSTMODERN GERMANY 
PETER O'BRIEN 
Trinity University 
Postmodernity would seem to bode ill for immigrant communities like the Turks 
living in Germany. Prominent theories of postmodern society, when analyzed in 
respect to the status of immigrants, pit several strikes against them. Taking as a 
given that Germany deserves the label "postmodern society," this essay discusses 
three such theories and draws out the implications of each for Turkish nationals 
residing in Germany. The findings are anything but merry. If the theories prove true, 
Turkish migrants from Turkey should expect little or no improvement in their lot and, 
worse, deterioration. This said, I refuse to conclude the essay on a note of pure 
pessimism. Although I dismiss the likely success of planned, deliberate resistance 
to worsening conditions for immigrants, I point to unplanned, spontaneous 
resistance which can be successful if not predictable. 
Though doubtless trendy, the craze of theorizing about postmodernity over the last 
two decades has produced much thought of lasting, penetrating value. Too little of 
this work has found its way into the social scientific research on migration despite (or 
perhaps because of) the fact that theories of postmodernity suggest mainly 
unhappy futures for immigrants. Below I look at the theory of 1) the two-thirds 
society, 2) the risk society, and 3) the truthless society. 
The Two-Thirds Society 
For over a decade students of post - modern (often called "postFordist") political 
economy have discerned an historically unprecedented development in advanced 
industrial nations: the formation of a permanent underclass comprising a minority of 
the members of a given society. Before the advent of the Keynesian welfare state 
during and after the Great Depression, capitalism functioned with an 
underpri\lileged proletariat comprising the vast majority. Both Keynesian and 
Marxist visions of social progress professed and predicted the ultimate elimination 
of the great underclass. Similarly, eminent students of "modern" citizenship, such as 
T.H. Marshall (1965), or of nationhood, such as Reinhard Bendix (1977), anticipated 
long, but nonetheless successful struggles for general equality of rights and 
privileges for all citizens, all nationals. 
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Three decades of steady expansion in welfare spending, whether termed a "welfare 
explosion" (Piven and Cloward, 1971) by one expert or "hubristic Keynesian ism" 
(Beer, 1982) by another, caused the middle class to swell into what Ralf Dahrendorf 
(1988:153) calls the "majority class." This was largely made possible, of cour�e. by 
liberal democratic political structures in which most decisions were made according 
to majority rule. For majority rule gives the economically underprivileged majority 
the political advantage to fight their inequality. But this critical political advantage 
dissipates, indeeds disappears altogether, as the underprivileged come to 
comprise a minority as has occurred in all major advanced industrial nations. In that 
case, majority rule turns into a political disadvantage. 
Dahrendorf, among others, argues that neither the economy nor the polity can be 
expected to come to the aid of the underprivileged minority in postmodern societies. 
Due to such factors as mechanization, outsourcing and the shifting of production to 
countries where labor costs are far lower, post - Fordist economies exhibit "a certain 
dissociation of economic growth and employment." (Dahrendorf, 1988:145) In other 
words, growth in GNP does not insure growth in employment; indeed, more likely is 
a decline in employment. To the extent that advanced industrial nations can prevent 
job flight, they will have to match conditions of employment in Third-World countries. 
Thus, David Harvey (1989:147-58) no1es the return of the "sweatshop" to some post 
- Fordist economies in the 1980s long after they had been eliminated in earlier 
decades. Whether as a result of un - or underemployment, claims Dahrendorf, post -
Fordist economies can be expected to spawn a sizable and permanent "underclass" 
of working and/or nonworking poor comprising anywhere from a quarter to a third of 
the entire population.(Dahrendorf, 1988:149) 
Yet, postmodern governments are less likely than modern ones to assist the 
underclass precisely because of majority rule. In Dahrendorf's (1988:153-54) 
words, 
It cannot be assumed as a matter of course that the majority class has 
an interest in breaking the cycle of deprivation of those who have 
dropped into an underclass position. On the contrary, in precarious 
times, the majority may well have an interest in actively defining some 
out and keeping them out to the protection of those who are in .... Marx 
thought that bourgeois society was unique in that for the first time the 
suppressed class - the class of the future - would comprise the 
overwhelming majority of the people who would organize and topple 
the ruling minority. In one sense, the opposite has happened. The 
overwhelming majority of the people have found a reasonably cosy 
existence .... But they are not sure the good times will last. They begin 
to draw boundaries which leave some out in the cold. Like earlier 
dominant classes. they have all kinds of reasons for drawing such lines. 
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Claus Otte dubs this potential majority "the great coalition ... between the traditional 
Left and traditional Right." 
Implicit in this project is a negative reference to the peripheral groups 
in the new social movements .... The logical public policy 
consequences of this assumption are repression and surveillance, 
exclusion and nondecisions, and, at best, a measure of symbolic 
politics aimed at preventing the peripheral elements from winning 
support among the old or new middle classes (Offe, 1987:96-99). 
As long as this coalition comprises an easy majority, say two-thirds, and majority 
rule stays in force, postmodern societies are likely to get easier for two thirds and 
harder for one third. 
Much evidence exists to suggest immigrants form a significant part of Germany's 
underclass. Each year the Federal Commissioner for Aliens publishes a report "on 
the Situation of Aliens in the Federal Republic." And in each report foreigners, taken 
as a statistical aggregate, register below Germans in basic socio-economic 
indicators. Thus, foreign workers make only 87% of what their German colleagues 
earn. Foreigners usually suffer a rate of unemployment twice that of Germans 
(Turks often thrice the German rate). Of the unemployed 41.3% of Germans but 
78.8% of immigrants possess no vocational degree. Among those who do work 
immigrants are overrepresented in low-paying, unskilled jobs. For example, while 
foreigners make up roughly 8% of the total German population, they constitute 
approximately one third of the workforce in the textile, janitorial, and hotel and 
restaurant industries. Inversely, when it comes to higher-paying jobs, Germans do 
much better than resident aliens (45.8% to 23.5% in skilled jobs, 53.5% to 19.1% in 
management positions). Immigrants generally live in more cramped, lower-quality 
flats (21.5 square meters per person among foreigners, 34.5 among Germans), 
even though they pay higher rents per square meter (6.92DM compared to 6.85DM 
for Germans). Foreigners' children tend to do less well at school than German 
pupils. While 26.8% of foreigners and 13.6% of Germans attend the Hauptschule, 
10.0% of foreigners and 24.1 % of Germans enroll in Gymnasium. The latter 
records, of course, suggest that the inequities between foreigners and citizens will 
persist into the future (Bericht, 1994). 
General socio-economic indicators reveal only one other large group in German 
society which is systematically underprivileged: the east Germans. (O'Brien, 
1996a:114-20) Together, immigrants (around 7 million) and east Germans (around 
16 million) comprise close to 29% of the total population. In other words, united 
Germany appears well on its way to becoming the stereotypical "two-thirds society" 
with a permanent minority underclass. 
Are there signs that the mostly west German majority class is coalescing behind 
anti-immigrant policies and practices? The toughening of the land's refugee laws in 
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1993 stands out. Because the reforms meant amending the constitution (Article 16) 
Helmut Kohl's government needed two-thirds support in the Bundestag. Kohl had 
frequently failed to muster this support due to the steadfast refusal of the Social 
Democrats to sign on. That abruptly changed in 1993 when an arson attack on a 
refugee hostel in Solingen killed five Turks. Social Democratic leaders felt their party 
had to respond boldly to the refugee issue because it had reached crisis proportions. 
They cut a deal with Kohl, the legislation designed to make it harder for refugees to 
enter Germany and easier for officials to deport them received the needed two­
thirds vote in the Bundestag, and went into effect on July 1, 1993. Offe's "great 
coalition between the traditional Right and the traditional Left" had been formed (Of­
fe, 1987). Furthermore, the stark insensitivity of the legislation {blaming and 
attacking the victims rather than the perpetrators of xenophobia) would seem to 
make likely future anti-immigrant legislation {perhaps similar to the Welfare Reform 
Bill passed by the great coalition in the US during the 1996 election year). 
The Risk Society 
Ulrich Beck's vision of postmodernity is dominated by inescapeable risk. 
Postmodern problems distinguish themselves from modern ones through 
exponentially heightened risk (Beck, 1992). Whereas in modern society, Beck 
explains, threats to human physical well being were largely tangible and correctable 
(for example, hunger) as well as concentrated against a specific group (say the 
poor), postmodern threats tend to be intangible, uncorrectable and dangerous to 
everyone in society regardless of status (for example, ozone depletion). The latter 
are experienced more as risks (what might happen) than ravages (what actt1 111\ 
happens). Beck e�plains his argument in the following manner: 
The "logic" of risk production and distribution is developed 
comparison to the "logic" of the distribution of wealth (which has so tar 
determined social-theoretical thinking). At the center he the risks and 
consequences of modernization, which are revealed as irreversible 
threats to the life of plants, animals, and human beings. Unlike the
factory-related or occupational hazards of the nineteenth.and the first 
half of the twentieth centuries, these can no tonger be 1lmited to certain 
localities or groups, but rather exhibit a tendency to globalizqtion which 
spans production and reproduction as much a.s national borders, and 
in this sense brings into being supra-national and norrclass-specific 
global hazards with a new type of social and political 
dynamism ... (Beck, 1992:13). 
Beck underscores the irreversibility of postmodern threats. Unlike modern 
problems, postmodern ones elude rational, scientific solutions. The rational solution 
to hunger, for instance, was obvious and feasible: feed people. But what is the 
rational solution to postmodern problems like global warming or the Chernobyl 
accident? The "new ... political dynamism" privileges irrational over rational forms of 
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persuasion in postmodern politics. In the absence of rational solutions, Beck 
contends, the voices of reason (of scientists and other experts) become muted. In 
their place grow louder the irrational voices of doomsayers who greatly exaggerate 
risks and proffer irrational solutions. 
Elsewhere I have argued that immigration deserves to qualify as a postmodern risk 
phenomenon (O'Brien, 1996b). The source or cause of migration to Germany has 
become increasingly intangible and uncontrollable. In the Fifties and Sixties, public 
officials knew exactly where to recruit migrants and carefully controlled the number 
of them entering and exiting the land. But today, because resident aliens enjoy rights 
of uniting their families, it is difficult effectively to regulate the number of immigrants. 
For instance, Bonn offically halted recruitment of foreign workers in 1973; since 
then, the number of resident aliens in the land has steadily increased. (Bericht, 
1994: 92) With each migrant permitted to immigrate there really is no longer a way to 
know how many, in the long term, have indirectly been accepted. 
Relatedly, Germans have little control over whence or why migrants come to the 
Federal Republic. The so-called "push factors" in migration can abruptly change, 
sending an unexpected wave of refugees. This occurred after the coup in Turkey in 
1980 and after the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia in 1991. Such incidents as well as 
the potential number of migrants they will send off are virtually impossible to predict. 
Nothing better dramatized the risk involved in migration than the sudden revolutions 
in East Europe in 1989 which raised the Iron Curtain. Estimates of the total of 
potential emigrants from the area ran as high as 25 million. West Germany was 
essentially "forced" to annex the German Democratic Republic lest its citizens 
crowd into the already densely populated Federal Republic. And although Germany 
appears temporarily to have stemmed the tide of east European emigration through 
astronomically expensive aid packages of one sort or the other, scary "what-ifs" 
continue to trouble Germans -- what if the eastern European economies collapse, 
what if the region is struck by a major environmental disaster? 
Germans have also experienced how difficult it is to foresee the domestic 
consequences of migration. What began as an "all-win-no-lose" prospect of 
recruiting young, healthy foreign men has mushroomed into a complicated social 
phenomenon generating many dilemmas. The existence of millions of foreign pupils 
has forced the educational system to tackle difficult financial and cultural issues 
surrounding multi-cultural student bodies. Ethnic enclaves like the many Turkish 
communities in Germany have produced organizations whose actions and 
principles often conflict with German law. Germans themselves have in response to 
migration jettisoned the predominant values of the Federal Republic's liberal 
democra,cy by supporting xenophobic parties and commiting or tolerating acts of 
violence against foreigners. And again, there is no certain way to predict what 
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impact these developments will have on Germany in the future. In this vein, an 
election analyst warns: 
the number of voters who decide in favor of the extreme right-wing 
parties represents only a relatively small part of the general readiness 
for adopting a right-wing point of view and the protest potential which 
exists for our society and which could be mobilized in favour of a right­
wing party, e.g. in the case of an economic crisis or under the strong 
pressure of immigration (Jaschke, 1993:127). 
Today, the risks of migration threaten everyone. Gone are the days when only a 
handful of police officers, plant managers and slum landlords have to deal with 
migrants. Virtually everyone's children share classrooms and resources with 
foreign pupils. Scarce are the Germans who do not have a foreign colleague. All of 
Germany's public agencies serve and deal with resident aliens alongside German 
clients. Everyone's taxes go to pay for the countless public programs which address 
issues of migration. Reports of violent skirmishes between neo-Nazis and 
foreigners or between factions of foreigners themselves pepper the daily 
newspapers. Migration is now a collective, national problem atop the political 
agenda. Not long after Unification, three quarters of polled Germans designated the 
"foreigner problem" as the most important issue confronting Germany (Leggewie, 
1993:165). 
Effective solutions to the problems of migration evade policy makers. Amidst anti­
migrant sentiment following the recession of 1973, for example, the Schmidt 
administration initiated its "consolidation policy" (Konsolidierungspoliti/9 to reduce 
the number of foreigners in the land. By the time Schmidt left office, the number of 
foreigners had grown by 700,000 (Bericht, 1994:92). Kohl's "return policy" 
(Ruckkehrpolitik) met with the same fate a decade later. By 1992, the number of 
foreigners in the land had increased by nearly 2 million (Bericht, 1994:92). 
Foreigners enjoy a host of rights through the Basic Law or various international 
treaties which make it difficult for the state to control their entrance and exit. The 
same fate befell numerous other policies designed to sequester, silence or neglect 
migrants living in the Federal Republic. They foundered in the courts on the shoals 
of the extensive social and civil rights guaranteed by the Basic Law (O'Brien, 1996a: 
43-105). These policy failures in turn increase the (perceived) risk of migration 
because as long as they continue to fail, it is impossible to know how long or to what 
extent the problems of migration will confront the Federal Republic. 
As already intimated, Beck (1992:29) predicts the decline if not demise of reason in 
postmodern politics. Or as he puts it, "in definitions of risk the sciences' monopoly 
on rationality is broken .... There is no expert on risk."Rational discourse based on 
grounding arguments in independent empirical or logical fow1dations stands at a 
disadvantage in the risk society because risks are ultimately produced by and 
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dependent upon consciousness. That is, if someone feels at risk, the risk exists: and 
the greater the risk is experienced, the greater it becomes. As Beck (1992:23) puts 
it, "in class and stratification positions being determines consciousness, while in risk 
positions consciousness determines being". In such an environment, those who 
are adept at shaping consciousness have considerable political advantage over 
those who merely measure being. 
In the Eighties and Nineties, irrational voices keen to foment fear and hatred of 
immigrants have increasingly drowned out the voices of reason. During the 
Seventies, talk of "integration" dominated the discussion of immigration. Politicians 
debated the desired extent and pace of integration but virtually all accepted it as the 
primary goal of immigration policy. For all its faults and foibles, integration does 
constitute a rational response to large-scale immigration. But in 1982, the ambitious 
leader of the opposition sensed the potential political payoff of unreqson. Keen to 
unseat Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Helmut Kohl made immigration reform a major 
element of his relentless attacks on the administration. "The number of foreign 
citizens must be reduced" he proclaimed shortly before ousting Schmidt. Kohl knew 
perfectly well that it was the position of his own party as well as of its chief supporter, 
the German Association of Employers. that the German economy would become 
more dependent on foreign labor in the future due to lower birthrates among 
Germans. More outlandish claims were made in the effort to usurp Schmidt. Soon­
to-be Interior Minister Friedrich Zimmermann complained that Germans were 
"becoming a minority in their own land."(Elsner and Lehmann, 1989: 276) Needless 
to say, he offered no statistics to prove this absurd claim. A party communique 
published that year contended that "the limit of burdenablity for our state and its 
population, for the infrastructure as well as for the housing and job market has been 
reached" ("Union," 1982:11-13). It too conveniently neglected to note that West 
Germany took on over 8 million German immigrants between 1945-51 without 
disaster. Nor did the paper refer its readers to the countless scientific analyses 
which show immigrants to be a net gain for rather than drain on German society ($en 
and Goldberg, 1994). 
Upon becoming Chancellor, Kohl announced, two weeks before national elections 
he called to confirm his majority support in the Bundestag, a slate of harsh 
measures he would implement after the election to curb immigration. Most of the 
measures, such as lowering from 16 to 6. the age at which a child could legally 
immigrate to Germany to be with its parent(s), Kohl and his advisors knew were 
unconstitutional. And, in fact, after the election they were tabled. But they had the 
desired effect among an electorate 75% of which, according to pollsters, opposed 
the permanent presence of a large immigrant community in Germany (O'Brien, 
1996a:77-89). Kohl and his coalition partners were returned to parliament with a 
majority of seats. 
Others were quick to note the persuasiveness of unreason. The xenophobic 
Republican Party burst onto the political scene in 1985, winning over 7°/o of the vote 
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in West Berlin. And as already suggested, the decision by all but one of the parties 
represented in parliament to toughen Germany's asylum laws in 1993 amounted to 
a sheer mockery of logic and reason. In effect, the parlia-mentarians sought to 
discourage neo-Nazi violence by giving in to precisely the demands they were 
making: Keep foreigners 9ut! Advocates of immigrants and their rights should take 
heed and realize that rational arguments designed to protect or promote migrants 
are unlikely to be successful. They tend to fall on deaf ears in the risk society. 
The Truth less Society 
Postmodern societies distinguish themselves from their predecessors through the 
absence of accepted, guiding universal truths. For more than a century, a virtual 
army of Nietzscheans, Heideggerians, Foucauldians, Derrideans and others have 
been relentlessly hammering away at the foundations of Western thought -- and not 
without success. Deconstructivists of one sort or the other have spread suspicion in 
all transcendental claims, showing them to be biased or part of some hidden power 
play. This philosophical and cultural development prompted Jean-Frangois Lyotard 
(1984) in a much celebrated piece to declare the death of universal truths or what he 
termed "metanarratives." Living without transcendental philosophies which guide 
the way we organize ourselves and our societies had become "the postmodern 
condition:" "I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives" (Lyotard, 
1984:xxiv). 
Drawing out the political implications of Lyotard's work, Chantal Mouffe {1993:4-5) 
underscores "the impossibility of a world without antagonism" and."the illusion of 
consensus and unanimity" in postmodern politics. Gone are the days when all 
citizens (or even a majority of them) can unite behind one overarching ideology such 
as "all persons are created equal" or "we all belong to one nation." Postmodernity 
has sounded the death knell to all such universal truth claims and left us with 
ineradicable diversity and antagonism. 
Persons interested in better rights for immigrants, in other words, fool themselves 
when they think they can build mass support around ethical pleas for equality for or 
tolerance toward immigrants. Such calls were made in the Seventies in West 
Germany and met with considerable success as federal, state and local 
governments all promoted integration. Success was possible then because there 
existed a modern consensus in the land that the Germans must eschew the racist 
nationalism which had" made Hitler and the Holocaust possible. That consensus 
fizzled in the postmodern Eighties. Early on in the decade, Christian Democrats 
began complaining about the nation's low self-esteem. This they blamed on an 
antequated hang-up with Hitler and the Holocaust. Franz Josef Straus, for instance, 
implored his compatriots to stop viewing their past "as an endless chain of mistakes 
and crimes." It was time for Germany "to emerge from the shadow of the Third Reich" 
and "become a normal nation again." It was time for Germans to "walk tall "(Evans, 
1989:19). Conservative scholars, such as Michael StOrmer and Ernst Nolte, sought 
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to lessen the weight of guilt by arguing that the Holocaust was not uniquely evil. 
Others -- Pol Pot, Stalin, the Ottomans -- had committed genocides of similar 
magnitude and ignomy (Historikerstreit, 1987). Chancellor Kohl seemed 
influenced by these sentiments when he invited Ronald Reagan to Bitburg 
cemetery, where Waffen-SS men were buried, and began renewing long dormant 
demands for the reunification of East and West Germany. 
Protecting and promoting the German nation was no longer taboo, and nationalists 
began coming out of the woodwork. In 1981, for example, 15 professors of 
considerable esteem published the "Heidelberg Manifesto," which warned that 
integration with its goal of a "multicultural society" was causing "the mongrelization 
of our language, our culture, and our tradition." The CDU argued it had an 
"obligation" to reduce the number of foreigners in the land in order to make room for 
emigres "from German-speaking territories" ("Union:" 1982). Citizen initiatives 
named "Lists Against Foreigners" sprang up in the early Eighties in several Lander 
and eventually formed into the Republican Party with its openly racist and 
xenophobic platform. The nationalist euphoria surrounding Unification in 1990 
reinvigorated the underground neo-Nazi movement. It increased its attacks on and 
marches against foreigners. In Rostock in 1992, German citizens were seen 
cheering on neo-Nazis as they burned down a dormitory for refugees and tormented 
those fleeing the blaze (O'Brien, 1996a:107-10). 
It would be an exaggeration to claim a tidal wave of nationalism swept the land. Neo­
Nazi incidents remained isolated if more frequent. Large counterdemonstrations 
against neo-Nazi violence were organized throughout Germany to protest Rostock 
and other incidents like it. Prominent politicians, like President Richard von 
Weizsacker, condemned nationalism (O'Brien, 1996a:110-14). No nationalist 
consensus emerged, but it did become equally acceptable to favor integration as to 
favor "reintegration" {Kohl's euphemism for repatriation). 
Not only Germans suffered from lack of consensus. Immigrants have found it 
impossible to unite even among themselves. Not only have different national and 
religious identities hampered cooperation between, say, Greek and Turkish or 
Christian and Muslim immigrants, immigrants sharing the same nationality or 
religion have found it hard to see eye to eye on matters. Within no group is the 
political diversity, indeed antagonism, greater than among the immigrants holding 
Turkish passports. Religious organizations range from the Avrupa Milli GorO§ 
Te§kilatlan to the islam KultOr Merkezleri Birligi to the government-sponsored 
Diyanet l§leri Turk islam Birligi all the way to the Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu. 
Politically, the list runs from the conservative Hurriyet9i Turk-Alman Dostluk 
Cemiyeti through the Sosyal Demokrat Halk Dernekleri Federasyonu and Go9men 
Dernekleri Federasyonu all the way to the Partiya Kerkeren Kurdistan. Not only do 
many of these organizations find it impossible to cooperate with one another, they 
often find themselves in vehement, at times violent conflict with one another ($en 
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and Goldberg: 1994:92-117). Such diversity is to be expected in postmodern 
society. By the same token, a unified immigrant community struggling together 
against worsening conditions is not to be expected. 
Unplanned Resistance 
Surprisingly, the Nineties have seen some of the greatest improvements in the 
rights and opportunities for Turkish nationals since immigration began in the Sixties. 
In 1990, a new Aliens Law went into effect and significantly liberalized the 
regulations governing naturalization. The new law dropped the difficult 
requirements for naturalization (proficiency in German, adequate housing, steep 
fees) from the 1965 Aliens Law and granted all resident aliens under 23 who had 
lived in Germany at feast eight years a right to become a German citizen. Those 23 
and older could naturalize after 15 years of residence. The greatest disincentive to 
naturalization -- the ban on dual citizenship -- the Kohl administration lifted in 1994 
for children under 18. Since then the Chancellor has talked about allowing dual 
citizenship for all soon. 
The government also intensified its efforts to protect resident aliens from violence. 
Between 1989 and 1995; state and federal governments banned ten neo-Naz1 
organizations. In 1993, the Bundestag amended the Victims Indemnity Law to 
make foreign victims equal to Germans in benefits. A year later Kohl's government 
successfully proposed that parliament expand the powers of the police and 
intelligence service to apprehend more right-wing extremists. The same legislation 
made public display of Nazi symbols a crime. Kohl had earmarked in 1992 DM 20 
million per year to combat neo-Nazi violence in east Germany. The measures 
proved effective. From 1993 to 1994, the number of reported hostile acts toward 
foreigners halved (O'Brien, 1996a:113-114). 
These significant improvements did not, however, result from a long and deliberate 
lobbying campaign on the part of immigrants and their backers. The acts came 
rather in response to perceived crises of the moment. Moreover, in .those crises 
immigrants' deadliest foes ironically acted as their greatest allies. The Aliens Law of 
1990 was hurried through the Bundestag as "emergency legislation" during the fall 
of 1989 to allay increasing fears among nervous onlookers (O'Brien: 1989) that the 
soon-to-be unified Germany would not repeat Hitler's mistakes. Ironically, swelling 
German national pride and solidarity aided the immigrants' cause. Similarly, neo­
Nazis did more to pass the other acts listed above than immigrants or their 
supporters. All of that legislation came shortly after and in direct response to highly 
publicized acts of terror against foreigners in Hoyerswerda in 1991, Rostock in 1992 
or Solingen in 1993. 
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CONCLUSION 
I do not wish to dismiss this legislation. It amounts to the most significant 
improvement in immigrants' rights in Germany in decades. I wish rather to dismiss 
the potential illusion that the legislation reflects some broadly based national 
consensus in favor of immigrants which can be tapped again and again in the future 
to continue improving the rights and opportunities of immigrants. The years 1989 to 
1994 were unique. No one, including the Germans, knew what a reunited Germany 
would do. The risk of making mistakes at a critical juncture in history moved German 
policy makers to act in bold ways. As the anxiety over the future of Germany 
subsides, policy makers are likely to return to their old incremental ways. 
Political activists for immigrants can learn from this experience. They can learn that 
conventional lobbying and organizing are unlikely to bear much fruit in postmodern 
society. They can learn to divert much of their energies and efforts to irrational 
arguments designed to spread fear and anxiety. And they can learn to redefine the 
meaning of "ally" from someone who believes as they do to anyone who directly or 
indirectly helps their cause. This may seem like unprincipled US pragmatism, but in 
postmodern politics it and only it works. 
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